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Abstract
This paper presents the Trust Level Routing (TLR) pro-
tocol, an extension of the optimized energy-delay rout-
ing (OEDR) protocol, focusing on the integrity, reliability
and survivability of the wireless network. TLR is similar
to OEDR in that they both are link state routing proto-
cols that run in a proactive mode and adopt the concept
of multi-point relay (MPR) nodes. However, TLR aims
at incorporating trust levels into routing by frequently
changing the MPR nodes as well as authenticating the
source node and contents of control packets. TLR calcu-
lates the link costs based on a composite metric (delay
incurred, energy available at the neighbor node, energy
spent during transmission and the number of packets sent
on each link) for the selection of MPR nodes. We highlight
the vulnerabilities in OEDR and show ways to counter the
possible attacks by using authentication and traffic par-
tition as a basis for mitigating the effects of malicious
activity. Network simulator NS2 results show that TLR
delivers the packets with a noticeable decrease in the av-
erage end-to-end delay with a small increase in the power
consumed due to the additional computational overhead
attributed to the security extension.
Keywords: Authentication, delay, energy, optimal route
1 Introduction
A Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is a group of wire-
less mobile nodes that form a dynamic network topol-
ogy without any centralized administration or fixed in-
frastructure. The nodes mobility requires establishing
and breaking connections whenever needed. Each node
communicates directly with the nodes within its wireless
range. However, the nodes need to collaborate together
to deliver the information between nodes that are beyond
the wireless range of the source. With this approach, in
terms of transmission, each node operates in two modes;
source or router. Source nodes generate the traffic on the
network whereas routing nodes receive the packets and
forward them to the intended destination.
A routing protocol is used to detect the topology of the
network and to enable each node to have a path to any
of its intended destinations. The nodes use Link State
Update (LSU) packets to share information among each
other to build their respective routing tables and report
any changes in network topology. The routing protocol
should focus on energy conservation to increase the life-
time of the nodes while choosing routes with the least
delay, jitter and congestion. Occasionally, the best routes
for several sources, in terms of delay, go through the same
node whose energy gets consumed at a higher rate com-
pared to other nodes. This, eventually, leads to a pre-
mature loss of the battery of the node. A more efficient
approach is to route packets through paths that may have
higher delays but with more energy resources in order to
extend the life time of the network. Another important
factor to be considered is the security of the communi-
cation among nodes. The routing protocol should detect
any attempt to change the LSUs in transit, reject fab-
ricated routing messages, avoid the creation of routing
loops that lead to denial of service attacks and exclude
all unauthorized nodes from the routing process.
The optimized link state routing protocol (OLSR) pro-
tocol [4] was proposed with the goal of reducing the flood-
ing of routing messages in a network by designating spe-
cific nodes to act as multi point relay nodes (MPR). The
selection is based on the hop count. The main drawback
of OLSR is that it is not suitable for the dynamic link
characteristics. OEDR [13] targeted the energy-delay op-
timization in OLSR and resulted in better performance
in terms of end-to-end delay and energy efficiency. Both
protocols, however, are prone to various security threats
that could impede their proper operation.
Security in ad hoc networks has been extensively stud-
ied and several security extensions have been proposed
for both reactive and proactive routing protocols. Some
examples of reactive routing include SAODV [16] which is
an extension of AODV that verifies Route Requests and
Route Replies using digital signatures. Also, [14] present
two approaches to improve the security of DSR. The first
approach is based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and
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the second is the Neighbor Set Detection (NSD). Each
approach has an advantage over the other. The PKI can
prevent the use of fabricated routing messages. On the
other hand, the NSD does not depend on preexisting secu-
rity mechanisms nor does it depend on resource-expensive
encryption and decryption operations. Simulation results
indicate a 0.95 probability of detecting a single attacker.
As for proactive routing, the work in [1] presented a basis
for identifying various threats and suggested methods for
solving them using a key distribution mechanism. The
idea is to use signatures and timestamps with routing
messages to avoid replay attacks. Another variation of se-
cure routing was given in [8], the secure link state routing
(SLSP) is robust against individual Byzantine attackers
but remains vulnerable to colluding attackers. The work
in [15] presents CSS-OLSR which ensures that the nodes
in the network cooperate with each other. The core of
this scheme is the penalty/reward system in which a co-
operating node gets a higher rating whereas the nodes
that refuse to cooperate receive a lower probability of
being selected as MPR nodes. In [11], a signature sys-
tem for OLSR is proposed to overcome the compromise
of trusted nodes. When a trusted node is compromised,
it can inject false routing messages into the network while
correctly signing them. The suggested solution is to use
the ADVSIG message which includes a timestamp and a
signature. When the ADVSIG is received, its contents
are stored in a Certiproof table for comparison with sub-
sequent messages. A technique to mitigate the wormhole
attacks is presented in [2]. Here, the nodes advertise the
hashes of the packets received within the previous k inter-
vals. A misbehaving node may be detected by comparing
the packet losses with a set threshold. Another algorithm
to thwart wormhole attacks is given in [10].
In this work, the nodes’ geographical location is embed-
ded in a SIGNATURE message. The extension is further
fortified by the use of directional antennae instead of om-
niscient ones to verify the direction from which the packet
was received. However, the disclosure of the nodes geo-
graphical location may prove harmful in situations where
such information needs to be concealed, e.g. military op-
erations. One suggested solution is ANODR [5], which
addresses route anonymity and location privacy to pre-
vent intruders from detecting the identities of transmit-
ting nodes or to trace a packet flow. ANODR employs a
loose definition of anonymity in which the identity of the
destination is disclosed to the intermediate nodes as well
as the number of hops between any intermediate node and
the source. To overcome the effects of such loose defini-
tion, ASR [17] was proposed with the goal of providing
identity anonymity and strong location privacy. ASR pro-
vides identity privacy to both of the source and destina-
tion as well as the ability to secure against multiple-to-one
DoS attacks when compared with ANODR. In this work,
we extend the current definition of OEDR to include trust
level. This is done by adding authentication and traffic
partition. With proper authentication, most of the mali-
cious packets can be ignored without affecting the proper
routing. Traffic partition is used to send the traffic in
different paths with the aim of denying an intruder the
chance to capture the whole stream of communication.
The paper is organized as follows, in Section 2 we
present some of the security threats in current link state
routing protocols followed by a discussion of the operation
of TLR in Section 3. Section 4 details the implementa-
tion of trust levels. Sections 5 and 6 detail the security
and optimality analyses of TLR, respectively. Simulation
results are given in Section 7 and the paper is concluded
in Section 8.
2 Security Threats
A major focus is the security of the ad hoc network where
the integrity of data is essential. Due to the absence of a
central authority for authentication, simple network func-
tions, such as packet forwarding, become susceptible to
attacks as they are executed by the nodes on the network
instead of trusted centralized routers.
To introduce trust levels, a node must examine the
trustworthiness of the nodes with which it communicates
before adding them to its routing table. The lack of au-
thentication can be a serious hazard to the proper oper-
ation of the routing protocol. OEDR does not provide
any security measures to guarantee the confidentiality,
integrity, availability and authenticity of the data and
proper routing. Because of this, malicious nodes can per-
form a variety of attacks to obstruct the communication
on the network. It should be emphasized, however, that
the following vulnerabilities are inherent in all link state
routing protocols and do not represent faults in the initial
design of OEDR.
2.1 Passive Attacks
In this form of attack, a node resides within the commu-
nication range of another node to capture all the informa-
tion sent. This vulnerability is especially harmful if the
intruder is within the range of the original source of traf-
fic and can only be solved using encryption. If, however,
the eavesdropper resides within the range of an MPR and
not the original sender then the effect can be reduced by
fragmenting the traffic into different paths.
One approach for traffic partition is to use the number
of packets sent through each MPR as a factor in calcu-
lating the cost of the link. As a result, with every packet
sent, the cost of the link will increase until a point is
reached where another link has a lower cost and the rout-
ing tables are updated to use a different MPR.
2.2 Active Attacks
These attacks can be categorized as fabrication, identity
spoofing, modification, or replay. Since routing functions
are performed by the nodes within the network, carry-
ing out such attacks is easier which will result in worse
consequences on the overall performance of the protocol.
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Moreover, the node mobility adds complexity to the de-
sign of a secure protocol. Following is an explanation of
these attacks and their effect on the routing protocol.
2.2.1 Fabrication
In this form of attack, a node generates false HELLO
or TC packets to cause changes in the routing tables of
the nodes. This could lead to routing loops or denial of
service. For the recipient, there is no way to verify the
correctness of the data received.
Examples of such an attack include generating TC
packets that contain either an incomplete list of the MPR
or a list of imaginary nodes. Another example involves the
false advertisement of bi-directional links to the nodes in
its neighborhood which may results in having it selected
as the MPR. At that point, the intruder can either drop
or selectively forward the packets to the MPR selector.
Finally, since the OEDR link cost calculation depends on
the reciprocal of remaining energy in the MPR candidate,
an adversary can sends a Hello packet showing that it has
a large amount of energy remaining in its battery. This
misleads the recipient node to calculate a low cost for
the link and thus selects the malicious node as its MPR.
At this point, all the traffic will be routed through this
malicious node which can either drop (denial of service),
selectively forward or change the contents of the packets.
2.2.2 Identity Spoofing
Since no authentication takes place, a malicious node can
masquerade as another node (identity spoofing). When
the neighboring nodes receive its Hello packets, they will
be misled to believe that the claimed node is within their
range. Later on, the deluded nodes will advertise them-
selves as the last hop to the intruder (which they mistak-
enly believe to be the legitimate node). This would result
in conflicting information in the network as well as denial
of service.
2.2.3 Modification
MPR nodes are responsible for forwarding the packets to
other nodes. While doing that task, a malicious MPR
may change the payload or even change the destination
field before transmitting the packet to the next hop. An-
other form of modification is to change the packet se-
quence number to match one that was previously used,
resulting in a packet drop.
2.2.4 Replay
A malicious node may hold copies of LSU packets that
were sent earlier and retransmit them at a later time
to poison the routing tables of the recipients with incor-
rect routing information. Although the destination nodes
check the sequence number of any received packet to avoid
duplicates, replay attacks can succeed by simply changing
the packet sequence number to a higher value.
These attacks can render the OLSR and OEDR proto-
cols ineffective. Security extensions are necessary in order
to ensure safe transfer of data which is discussed next.
3 Trust Level Routing
TLR is a proactive link state routing protocol. Its op-
eration is table driven through periodically exchanging
topology information with other nodes in the network.
The objective of the protocol is to give the same func-
tionality of OEDR as well as providing guarantees of the
integrity, timeliness and authenticity of the packets. Our
proposed protocol follows the lines of OEDR. However,
the routing criteria differ for selecting the MPR nodes.
There are several metrics to be considered.
Energy consumed per packet
For this metric, the best path is selected based on the least
consumed total energy. Any packet going from source n1





e(i, i+ 1) (1)
where Et is the total energy consumed and e(i, i+1) is the
energy consumed to send the packet from ni to ni+1
Delay per packet
Similar to the energy metric, the goal is to find the
path with the least total delay. For a packet going from
node n1 to node nk through some intermediate nodes, the
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where Dt is the total delay and d(i, i+1) is the time that
starts when a packet enters the queue of node ni until it
reaches the queue of ni+1.
It is worth mentioning that a trade off between the
two metrics exists. For example, in the network shown
in Figure 1, assuming that the energy consumed per each
link is equal, and that node B is heavily congested such
that
dA,D + dD,E + dE,C < dA,B + dB,C . (3)
Then according to the delay metric the route A,D,E,
and C will be taken instead of A,B,C. However, accord-
ing to the energy metric
eA,D + eD,E + eE,C > eA,B + eB,C . (4)
Which implies that route A,B,C should be chosen.
Furthermore, by selecting only one of the two metrics,
the paths will tend to be always the same (assuming no
mobility). As a result, some nodes will have high energy
consumption while others will retain their energy. Such
variance in node energy can result in network partition.
Thus we consider a third metric.






Figure 1: A simple ad hoc network consisting of 5 nodes
Residual energy levels
This metric is used to guarantee that all nodes will
have approximately equal rates of consumption by using
the nodes with the highest energy levels. That is, the
lower the remaining available energy in a node, the higher
the cost of routing through it. The cost in this case can
be taken as the reciprocal of the residual energy.
Traffic partition
This metric serves multiple purposes. First, less con-
gestion and delay will be incurred through the intermedi-
ate nodes. Second, a higher throughput will be achieved
because data packets are going through different paths.
More importantly, the traffic will be fragmented into mul-
tiple paths which can potentially reduce the ability of a
malicious node to capture the whole stream of traffic.
TLR depends on the following steps for proper opera-
tion: neighbor sensing, cost calculation, MPR selection,
broadcast of costs and routing table calculation. The fol-
lowing notations will be used:
• N : set of nodes in network;
• s: source node;
• d: destination node;
• N1(s): one-hop neighbors of node s;
• N2(s): two-hop neighbors of node s;
• MPR(s): the set of nodes selected as MPRs by node
s (MPR(s) ∈ N1(s));
• Px,y: number of packets sent from x through MPR
y;
• Cx,y: cost of link between nodes x and y, where
Cx,y = w1(Energyx→y)(Delayx→y) + w2Px,y. (5)
• Ex: Available energy of node x.
3.1 Neighbor Sensing
Each node maintains a table called the neighbor table that
stores information about the link status between the node
and all its immediate neighbors. Information about the
delay, energy consumption on each link, two-hop neigh-
bors accessible through the immediate neighbors, the set
of selected MPRs and the number of packets sent through
each MPR are also stored in the table. The table is popu-
lated using the HELLO messages. Every node in the net-
work periodically sends HELLO packets to all the nodes
within its transmission range. Each message contains a
list of neighbors of the originator, transmission time, en-
ergy level, and the amount of energy used for transmis-
sion.
When the message is received, an entry is added to
the table (if one does not already exist). The delay is
calculated as the difference between the time of reception
and time of transmission (we make the assumption that
the clocks are synchronized). Furthermore, the energy
consumption on the link is calculated in a similar manner
by comparing the energy level of the signal at the receiver
to the level stamped in the HELLO message.
If the originator of the HELLO message has no entries
in the neighbor table of the recipient (i.e. it just moved
into the vicinity of the recipient) then a reply will be sent
back with information about all authentic nodes and the
information associated with each (as will be discussed in
Section 4).
3.2 Cost Calculation
Since TLR bases the selection of MPRs on a composite
metric that differs from that of OLSR or OEDR, the MPR
set chosen does not necessarily have to be identical for
the same network topology and conditions. Moreover,
if the nodes are static, the MPR set for nodes running
OLSR will always be the same until one or more nodes lose
their battery power or the topology changes due to node
mobility. In TLR, the MPR set is dynamically changed
more frequently compared to OEDR.
3.3 MPR Selection Algorithm
• Initially the MPR set MPR(s) is empty.
• First, find all the nodes in N2(s) that have a single
neighbor in N1(s). Add these nodes of N1(s) to the
MPR set if they are not already in MPR(s). (Because
there are no other MPR candidates).
• While there exists a node in N2(s) for which MPR
node is not selected, then for each node in N2(s),
with multiple neighbors fromN1(s), select a neighbor
from N1(s) as multipoint relay node which results in
minimum cost from s to the node in N2(s), CMPR
according to Equation 5, and add it to the MPR set
if it is not already in MPR(s).
3.4 MPR and Costs Declaration
Every selected MPR will transmit LSU packets called the
Topology Control (TC) packets that contain information
about the MPR node’s selector set (i.e. the nodes that
have selected the originator of the TC message as their
MPR). The TC messages, which include the link costs
between the MPR node and its selectors, are forwarded
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throughout the network through MPR nodes only. When
a node receives a TC message, it can use the information
to build a ’topology table’, in which it stores the informa-
tion about the topology of the network and the associated
link costs. An entry in the topology table consists of the
address of a destination (an MPR selector in the received
TC message), address of the last-hop node to that desti-
nation (originator of the TC message), and the cost of the
link between the destination and its last hop. It implies
that the destination node can be reached in the last hop
through this last-hop node at the given cost [9].
In Section 4, a deeper discussion of the contents of TC
packets and how to maintain their integrity is given.
3.5 Routing Table Calculation
For each node, a routing table is maintained to route pack-
ets to their destinations. Each entry contains the desti-
nation address, next-hop address, estimated distance to
destination (in hops) and the total cost of the path from
the source to the destination. For every known destina-
tion, an entry is added to the routing table listing the
next hops to be taken. Our proposed protocol uses the
least cost spanning tree method.
4 TLR Implementation
With the vulnerabilities listed in Section 2, it is clear
that the operation of OLSR and OEDR would become
ineffective in the presence of malicious nodes. The main
requirements of security, i.e. origin authentication, time-
liness and ordering, and data integrity are missing in the
original implementations of both protocols. Every LSU
packet should hold enough information to clearly prove
that it originated from the claimed source. Furthermore,
late control packets should be dropped to avoid replay
attacks. Finally, a mechanism to detect any alteration of
LSU en route is needed. In this work, we propose two
methods for adding trust levels in the routing protocol:
traffic partition and authentication.
4.1 Traffic Partition
In this method, the traffic transmitted from source A to
destination B is routed through different paths by con-
tinuously switching between different MPR candidates.
This provides confidentiality and forbids eavesdropping
in the presence of a single eavesdropping node. With this
approach, each path contains only partial information of
the data stream. Consequently, an intruder will not be
able to reconstruct the whole flow. From equation 5, it is
evident that as the number of data packets increases on a
certain link, the cost of using that link will increase until
the total cost becomes higher than that of another link.
At this point, the MPR list of the source will be updated
to force a route change.
This scheme would not be sufficient, however, in the
presence of multiple eavesdropping nodes that may mon-
itor the different selected paths and combine the data for
analysis.
4.2 Authentication and Timestamps
Traffic partition provides a reasonable level of security
when combined with a lightweight encryption algorithm.
It is helpful in reducing the risk of passive attacks by
limiting the ability of one intruder to analyze the data
stream completely and in a timely manner. However, it
has little potential in overcoming or even detecting active
attacks. Authentication of the LSU source can be used
to counter active attacks. Assuming that the authentic
nodes in the network have a mechanism for sharing the
encryption keys, node A uses the shared key and the con-
tents of the LSU to calculate a Message Authentication
Code (MAC) which is appended to the LSU packet. When
Node B receives the packet, it calculates the MAC again
using the same secret key and the body of the received
packet (excluding the MAC). Node B accepts the packet
if the resulting MAC equals the MAC field of the packet.
If, however, a malicious node alters the message but does
not alter the MAC (because it does not have the secret
key), then Node B can easily detect the changes in the
packet and drop it.
This guarantees that the packet was sent by one of
the authentic nodes because only they have the shared
key and that the payload of the control packet was not
changed en route. The scheme above, by itself, is not
enough for authentication. Consider a scenario where
node A sends control messages to Node B. Assuming that
a malicious node M intercepts the control message, it
could wait for a random period of time and then retrans-
mit the same packet. When Node B receives the replayed
message, it checks the hash code and accepts the packet as
authentic. This will cause inconsistencies in the routing
table of Node B.
Timestamps can be used to overcome this problem.
Whenever a node sends a packet, it adds the time of
transmission as a field and includes that in the MAC cal-
culation. This enables the recipients to check the time of
transmission.
We propose the use of one way hash functions to cre-
ate a hash chain analogous to that given in [6]. The main
characteristic of a hash function is that it is easy to com-
pute in the forward direction but computationally infeasi-
ble to find its inverse. That is, given g = h(y) where his
the secure hash function whose input is y, then it is easy
to find g given y. However, the reverse process of finding
y¨ such that h(y¨) = g is too expensive to be practical. A
third condition to be satisfied is it is difficult to find two
values x and y such that h(x) = h(y), but x 6= y.
In this method, every node selects a random seed value
S and computes g1 = h(S) then it computes the next value
in the chain as g2 = h(g1). The whole sequence of hash
values is computed iteratively until the last value of the
chain is given.
g1 = h(S) , gi = h(gi−1) where 2 < i ≤ m and m is the
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length of the sequence.
The source node, A, starts using the hash chain in
the backward direction (i.e. it starts with gm followed by
gm−1, gm−2 etc). If a receiver knows the value of gi (where
2 < i ≤ m) and has guarantees that it is authentic then
the next packet coming from node A can be checked for
authenticity because it must be stamped by gi−1. The
receiver needs to check that h(gi−1) = gi as a proof of
authenticity.
4.3 Secure Broadcast of g
m
We assume that every node in the network has a mech-
anism to verify the public keys of all other nodes. We
further assume that all the clocks of the nodes are syn-
chronized (this assumption is needed for the proper calcu-
lation of delays in the OEDR protocol). It is worth men-
tioning that the use of public key cryptography is only
applied on the control packets which comprise a smaller
part of the whole packets being communicated.
The broadcast of the last calculated value in the chain
gm is done using a new packet called the Chain Tip packet.
The format of the packet is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Chain tip packet format
The packet has four fields; the identifier of the sending
node, a timestamp, the current iteration (CI) field (which
must be initially set to zero), and the last field that holds
the encrypted value of the concatenation of the previous
three fields and gm. When the packet is received, it will
be decrypted using the public key of the sender:
C = EKR[NodeID||timestamp||ChainLength(m)||gm]
EKU [C] = NodeID||timestamp||Chainlength(m)||gm.
After decryption, the Node ID field will be compared
with the decrypted value to make sure that it originated
from the claimed source. The timestamp field proves that
the message is ”fresh” and that it is not a replayed mes-
sage. The chain length field informs all recipient nodes
about how many iterations of the hash function had been
calculated to construct the chain, thus allowing them to
know when the last value in the chain has been reached.
Finally, gm will be stored in the memory along with its
associated Node ID.
Note, however, that any node that moves into the
neighborhood after gm has been delivered will not be able
to authenticate the received packets. This can be solved
by introducing a Hello-response packet that is sent back
from every node that receives the HELLO packet. (Refer
to Section 3.1).
The Hello-response should contain the same informa-
tion given in the Chain tip packet with the only difference
that the CI field will be set to the number of chain ele-
ments already received. For example, if a node received
gm, gm−1, , gm−i, then it will set the CI field to hold the
value of i before transmitting the Hello-response packet.
Thus, the originator of the HELLO packet will receive
the same information that it would have received through
a chain tip packet and will also have proof that it was
indeed sent from the claimed source (No other node can
forge it). Furthermore, by knowing the CI field, the node
can check for the authenticity of the any TC packet it
receives by calculating the hash function on the received
chain value i+ 1 times.
hi+1(gm−i−1) = gm. (6)
After that, the new node will have all the information
that is available to all other nodes.
To avoid multiple copies of Hello-response packets,
each node waits for a random time before replying back
with its Hello-response while overhearing the responses
of other nodes. If any matching Hello-response packet is
overheard then the node backs off and does not transmit,
otherwise it sends its own version of the Hello-response.
4.4 Broadcasting TC Packets
The main purpose of using authentication is to guarantee
that the TC packet was generated by the claimed source
and that the contents were not changed in transit. Follow-
ing is a description of how the hash chain can be applied.
1) Select a new random seed and calculate the hash
chain;
2) Broadcast gm;
3) For 1 ≤ i < m
• Find the message digest of the concatenation of
the node ID, timestamp, message, and gm−i.
• Transmit the node ID, timestamp, message and
the calculated hash value.
• Wait for a set period of time to make sure that
the TC message reached all destinations in the
network then transmit gm−i to update the cur-
rent hash value being used.
• Increment i.
• If (i = m) then the chain has been consumed
and a new chain has to be created (Step 1). Oth-
erwise, repeat Step 3 for the next TC packet.
When a node receives the TC packet, it has no way to
calculate the message digest because gm−i is not known
yet. The node must wait until it receives the value of
gm−i to verify the authenticity and integrity of the latest
received TC packet.
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Note that this update packet must be received within
a protocol specific period of time after the TC packet to
guarantee that none of the intermediate nodes held the
TC packet until gm−i was released. This is an essential
condition without which any malicious node can modify
the contents of the packet and calculate a new message
digest before sending the TC packet followed by the value
of gm−i. The recipient, in this case, will not be able to
detect the changes.
For that reason, the recipient node compares the cur-
rent time with the timestamp. If it finds that updating
with the value of gm−i took more time than expected then
it drops the TC packet.
5 Security Analysis of TLR
In this section, we analyze the ability of TLR to limit
various attacks.
5.1 Replay Attacks
An adversary may hold old copies of TC packets to trans-
mit them at a later instance of time. This would result
in conflicting information in the routing tables since ei-
ther the topology or the MPR nodes would have changed.
TLR mitigates this threat with the use of a timestamp in
packets which is further enforced by the hash chain.
5.2 Identity Spoofing and Link Spoofing
Identity spoofing involves a node using an ID that does
not belong to it whereas link spoofing attacks occur when
a node sends out incomplete or forged information about
its links. The presence of the mechanism for verifying the
keys of other nodes limits the ability of an attacker to
attempt identity spoofing. Furthermore, in normal cases,
only the packets signed by trusted nodes are accepted and
all others are rejected thus a malicious node can not run a
link spoofing attack since it packets will not be accepted.
5.3 Modification Attacks
An adversary may change the contents of TC packets in
an attempt to add, delete or alter the entries of the rout-
ing tables. This may result in routing loops or dropped
packets due to incomplete routes. In TLR, modifying the
contents of a TC packet will be detected since the intruder
has no access to the held hash value. A malicious node
trying to relay a modified TC packet will need to wait for
that unknown hash value which would make it too late for
it to transmit its modifications since that packet would be
dropped.
5.4 Passive Attacks
As mentioned earlier, a node may listen in to capture the
data stream. If the node is overhearing the source itself
then only encryption may protect the data. However, if
the eavesdropper is positioned around one of the MPR
nodes then TLR can be helpful by partitioning the data
stream through different paths. By doing so, the intruder
will only have a part of the data stream. With multiple
cooperating intruders, the stream may be gathered in full
and the protection of encryption is the last line of defense.
It is implicitly assumed that all the nodes that were
selected as MPRs would cooperate in relaying the packets
to the destination. In the case of a compromised node,
some packets may be dropped instead of being relayed.
TLR can not detect this but due to its frequent topology
updates it may limit this attack by switching to different
MPR nodes. The work in [15] provides a protocol that
addresses this problem in specific.
We give a comparison between TLR, SLSP [8], and
CSS-OLSR [15] in Table 1. The comparison is based on
the ability of each of the respective protocols to success-
fully limit the effects of an attack.
6 Optimality Analysis of TLR
Theorem 1. Only authentic nodes can be selected as
MPR nodes.
Each packet received is checked for authenticity of
source and content. Non-authentic packets are dropped
by the recipient and no entries are made in the neighbor
table. Hence, non-authentic nodes do not qualify as MPR
candidates.
Theorem 2. The MPR selection will result in a trusted
optimal route between the source and destination with
added trust levels only if there are multiple MPR candi-
dates.
Case I: If a node in N2(s) has only one neighbor from
N1(s), then that single neighbor will be selected as the
MPR. This MPR will be selected always in an optimal
route but there will be no traffic partition.
Case II: If a node in N2(s) has multiple neighbors in
N1(s), the MPR selection will follow the cost function to
determine the path with the least cost. Since the costs
are dynamic due to the nature of the network and traffic
sent, the paths selected will be dynamic to allow for traffic
partition in addition to the energy-delay considerations.
Assume that a source node s that has multiple one-hop
neighbors in N1(s) needs to reach a node d in N2(s) that
has multiple neighbor nodes n1, n2, ..., nk(k > 1) belong-
ing to N1(s). Let the cost to reach any of these neighbors
from s be Cs,ni(i = 1, 2, , k) and the cost to reach d
from ni is given by Cni,d. The MPR node between s
and d is selected as the node ni with the minimum cost
min ((Cs,n1 + Cn1,d), (Cs,n2 + Cn2,d), ..., (Cs,nk + Cnk,d)).
The cost values of Cs,ni change frequently and a different
MPR is selected. Consequently, the MPR selection of
TLR will result in trusted optimal routes with trust
levels from s to its two-hop neighbors in N2(s).
Lemma 1. All intermediate nodes on the trusted opti-
mal path are selected as multipoint relays by the preceding
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Table 1: Comparison between SLSP, CSS-OLSR, and TLR
SLSP CSS-OLSR TLR
Replay NO YES YES
Identity Spoofing YES YES YES
Link Spoofing YES YES YES
Modification YES Partial YES
Traffic Relay Refusal NO YES Partial
Evesdropping NO NO YES
nodes on the path.
Proof. To be selected as an MPR, a node has to prove
its authenticity, provide connection between the source
node and its two-hop neighbors and have the lowest link
cost.
Case I: The node in N1(s) of the source node s does not
provide connection to any node in N2(s). Node n2
has no direct connection to node d. The two possible









Figure 3: Case I
Considering the added delay and energy consump-
tion, it is clear that n2 is not on the optimal path
from s to d.
Case II: The node n2 in N1(s) of the source s does not
provide proof of authenticity to any node in N2(s).
Any packet received from it by any node in the N2(s)
will be dropped.
Case III: There is a trusted optimal path from source
to destination such that all the intermediate nodes
on the path are selected as MPRs by their previous
nodes on the same path.
Figure 4: Case III
Suppose that in an optimal path, s → n1 → n2 →
... → nk → nk+1 → ... → d, both MPR and non-MPR
nodes exist. Also, based on the result of Cases I and II,
we suppose that for each node on the path, its next node
on the path is its one-hop neighbor, and the node two
hops away from it is its two-hop neighbor.
1) Suppose that on the optimal route, the first inter-
mediate node n1 does not meet the criteria for MPR
selection by source s. However, n2 is the two-hop
neighbor of s. Based on the basic idea of MPR se-
lection, every two-hop neighbor of s must be covered
by its MPR set, then s must select another neighbor
as its MPR. In this case, n
′
1 is selected as the MPR
to cover node n2.
Since route s → n1 → n2 → ... → d is a trusted
optimal path then s → n
′
1 → n2 → ... → d is also
a trusted optimal path. Thus, the MPR is a part of
the optimal path.
2) Assume that on the optimal route s → n1 → n2 →
...→ nk → nk+1 → ...→ d, all the nodes on segment
n1 → ... → nk are chosen as MPR by their previous
node, we now prove that the next hop node of nk is
on the optimal route is an MPR.
Suppose that nk+1 is not an MPR of nk. Same as in
the previous situation, nk+2 is the two-hop neighbor
of nk, so it must have another neighbor n
′
k+1 which
covers nk+2. Since route s→ n1 → n2 → ...→ nk →
nk+1 → ... → d is an optimal path then s → n1 →
n2 → ... → nk → n
′
k+1 → ... → d is also an optimal
path because it has a lower cost.
This implies that in an optimal route, the kth inter-
mediate node selects the (k+1)th node as the MPR.
Based on I and II, all the intermediate nodes of an
optimal path are MPRs of the previous node.
Theorem 3. For all pairs of nodes s and d, if s transmits
a broadcast packet P , d will receive a copy of that packet.
Proof. The proof follows on similar lines to [13]. Let k be
the number of hops to d from which a copy of packet P
has been retransmitted. We shall prove that there exists
a minimum k = 1, i.e., a one-hop neighbor of d which
eventually forwards the packet.
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Assume that nk(k = 2) forwards the packet P to node
d. Assume there exists a path nk → nk − 1 → nk−2 →
...→ n2 → n1 → d.
Based on Lemma 1, any packet received by nk−1 from
nk must be relayed to nk−2. Similarly, when nk−2 receives
the packet, it forwards it to nk−3. This repeats until node
n1 receives the packet where it is automatically forwarded
to node d.
7 Simulation Results
To simulate the protocol modifications, the NS2 imple-
mentation of OEDR was extended to reflect the changes
in cost calculation. A new table was added in each node to
hold the number of packets sent on each link. The OEDR
implementation in NS2 was modified by adding defini-
tions for the malicious nodes and providing a mechanism
for authentication. Every packet received is checked in the
MAC layer, and any packet from a non-authentic source
is dropped. This means that no entries will be added in
the one-hop or two hop tables.
The simulation scenarios were based on networks of 50
and 200 nodes. The data rates varied from 128 kbps to
4096 kbps with a packet size of 512 bytes. The nodes were
stationary in an area of 1000×1000 meters, their locations
and flows were randomly generated. The performance of
the OLSR, OEDR and TLR was compared based on the
end-to-end delay and the energy-delay product.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 display the average end-to-end
delay for data packets on networks of 50 and 200 nodes, re-
spectively. The delay in TLR is similar to that of OEDR.
In some cases, however, it is less and that is due to the
implicit congestion avoidance in TLR. When a sequence
of packets is sent through a path, the congestion in the
intermediate nodes will increase. Since TLR sends data
through different paths, it avoids causing congestion in
the intermediate nodes, thus reducing the average delay.
The figures also show that the delay for OLSR is higher;
this is because OEDR and TLR consider the delay as a
factor in choosing the routes whereas OLSR just selects
















































Figure 6: Delay for the three routing protocols in a 200
node network
In Figure 7 and Figure 8, the energy-delay per packet
is given for networks of 50 and 200 nodes, respectively.
OLSR always has a higher energy-delay product com-
pared to OEDR and TLR. From the figures, we also note
that OEDR performs better in terms of this metric. This
is explained by the introduction of the packet count as a
metric which forces the nodes to select some MPR nodes
that are not optimal in terms of energy consumption and
link delay.
By comparing Figure 7 with Figure 8, we find that
the energy-delay metric increases as the number of nodes
increases. This is due to the higher amount of traffic
flowing in the network and the use of different paths with
more intermediate hops (i.e. more energy consumption).

































Figure 7: (Energy* Delay) for the three routing protocols
in a 50 node network
To demonstrate the effect of changing the weights
in Equation 5 on the delay and the (Energy * De-
lay), we simulated the same network of 50 nodes run-
ning the TLR protocol for three cases (w1, w2 =
(1.0, 0.0), (0.5, 0.5), (0.25, 0.75)). From Figure 9, when w1
decreases from 1.0 to 0.5 we notice that the delay de-
creases, this is because of the inherent congestion avoid-
ance as we mentioned earlier. However, when w1 de-
creases from 0.5 to 0.25 the effect of that is an increase
in the delay because the paths being selected are not nec-
essarily the optimal paths in terms of delay, rather they
are mostly selected based on the number of packet flowing
through each MPR.
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Figure 8: (Energy* Delay) for the three routing protocols
in a 200 node network






















Figure 9: Delay for the TLR with variable weights in a
50 node network
Figure 10 shows that the energy times delay factor will
increase as the values of w1 decreases. This is because
the MPRs will be selected mainly based on the number
of packets going through them.

































Figure 10: (Energy* Delay) for the TLR with variable
weights in a 50 node network
8 Conclusions
With the rapid deployment of wireless networks, security
of the routing protocols is essential for reliable operation.
The threats presented in this paper indicate that more
work is needed to guarantee the privacy and integrity of
the data. This is especially important in military and
safety critical environments.
TLR, an extension of the OEDR protocol, resulted in
better management of route selection for security pur-
poses. The simulation results indicate that TLR deliv-
ered the packets with a noticeable decrease in the average
end-to-end delay. This, however, increased the power con-
sumed when longer routes were selected.
The addition of the authentication model in NS2
demonstrated how the TLR protocol dropped non-
authentic control packets. Nevertheless, more work needs
to be done to improve the model to enable the analysis
of the computational overhead involved in computing the
hash fields as well as the bandwidth utilized for the addi-
tional bytes inserted into the control packet in the form
of the hash code.
Another modification to be investigated is the weight
calculation equation given in Equation 5. A dynamic
model that allows assigning different weights to each fac-
tor would be more suitable in cases where, for example,
delay is given higher priority than energy consumption.
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